Presented by Carahsoft
Cyber has traditionally enabled military functions such as intelligence, command and control, movement and fires. That may not always be its supporting role. Chris Page, Acting Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations N6N9C for the U.S. Navy, says cyber could become the main effort during a battle, a phase of conflict or even an entire military campaign.
Speaking at the Billington Cybersecurity Summit 2026, Page explains that this possibility should influence how the Navy designs its architecture, organizes its people and prepares forces for future operations.
Cyber capabilities can remain inside a target environment for long periods. An adversary can use that access to steal intellectual property, weaken public confidence or prepare to disrupt military forces during a crisis. Because the same access may support espionage or a future attack, commanders could also confront difficult decisions involving intent and escalation.
“There is a very thin line, one easily crossed, between espionage and attack,” Page says.
That ambiguity means military leaders need tools and operational concepts that help them contain crises while preserving their ability to respond.
Sailors learn to fight fires, control flooding and respond to casualties so a damaged ship can remain afloat and continue its mission. The principle is not based on preventing every possible failure. It assumes damage will occur and prepares the crew to operate through it.
That same mentality can guide cyber resilience. The Navy should expect that networks and systems will be contested and that some capabilities may become unavailable during an attack. The objective is to prevent those disruptions from ending the mission.
Page points to a familiar damage-control principle: Do not lose confidence in the ship’s ability to fight hurt. In cyber operations, confidence comes from knowing what to do when systems fail and having practiced that response before a real incident.
Detailed procedures are one part of that preparation. Crews need planned responses for likely contingencies, along with exercises and inspections that test whether those plans work. Repetition gives sailors confidence that they can respond effectively even during the most difficult moment of an operation.
Ships must also be prepared to operate without dependable external communications. Page notes that naval platforms already have active and passive sensors that provide local awareness when they are disconnected.
They also carry data collected during an operation and information loaded before deployment. That combination can help crews navigate, maintain equipment and understand their surroundings even when they cannot access the full set of networked capabilities available during normal operations.
Modern naval platforms consequently function as large repositories of operational information. Page describes the Navy’s nearly 300 battle-force ships as “300 floating data centers.”
Those platforms will not have the same capabilities offline that they possess when fully connected. The goal is to ensure they retain enough data, applications and computing capacity to keep operating.
The Navy still has work to do to organize and use that information effectively, Page says, but it is not beginning from zero. Ships, submarines and aircraft already generate and store significant amounts of data at the edge.
Resilient systems and accessible data matter, but Page identifies trained sailors as the Navy’s most important resource.
Maintainers, navigators, intelligence specialists and other subject-matter experts understand their equipment and missions beyond what any single application can provide. Their knowledge allows a crew to adapt when an automated tool or network connection becomes unavailable.
Artificial intelligence adds another element to the threat. Page is particularly concerned about convergence—the possibility that an adversary could combine several AI-enabled techniques into a coordinated campaign.
A phishing operation may become far more dangerous when paired with synthetic media, stolen data and a compromised identity. Each element may be manageable independently, but their convergence could create an attack that is difficult to recognize and contain.
Preparing for that scenario requires the Navy to examine how threats could work together rather than evaluating each one in isolation. It also reinforces the need for resilient platforms, rehearsed responses and sailors who are ready to continue the mission after cyber damage occurs.
Key Takeaways