September 18, 2026
Forty years after Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols reforms, retired Marine Corps Maj. Gen. Arnold Punaro says the Pentagon can look back at that effort for lessons on tackling some of its biggest management and acquisition challenges today.
Punaro, CEO of The Punaro Group and chair emeritus of the National Defense Industrial Association, says the 1986 reforms emerge after Congress spends years examining failures across the Defense Department.
Those challenges include Vietnam, the failed Desert One rescue attempt in Iran, problems during the operation in Grenada and the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut. At the same time, concerns are growing about whether the Pentagon is getting enough value from its acquisition system.
The resulting reforms make significant changes to the department. Punaro says Goldwater-Nichols streamlines the operational chain of command, strengthens civilian control of the military and helps establish the joint force that exists today. He also points to the institutionalization of special operations as another major success.
But he argues the Pentagon still has unfinished business.
“What’s broken still, in my judgment, is the management chain of command,” Punaro says.
That includes personnel, budgets, acquisition and requirements. Despite ongoing reform efforts, Punaro says it still takes too long to field capabilities and the department continues to struggle with costs, bureaucracy and what he describes as “gold-plated requirements.”
He also points to the Pentagon’s defense agencies as an area that deserves attention, arguing those large organizations include significant bureaucracy and processes that need reform.
Punaro says Congress has an important role to play in making changes last.
Internal Pentagon directives can be reversed by future leaders, he explains, while changes written into law can provide greater permanence. Congress can also use its oversight responsibilities to determine whether acquisition reforms are actually producing results, including getting weapons into the field faster and at reasonable prices.
One of the biggest lessons from Goldwater-Nichols, Punaro says, is the importance of incentives.
Joint-duty requirements helped encourage military leaders to operate across service lines and contributed to a broader cultural shift toward today's joint force. Punaro believes a similar change is needed within the acquisition enterprise.
“You need the cultural change, and we certainly need to change the incentives for the acquisition bureaucracy,” he says.
Punaro also cautions against assuming emerging technology will eliminate the need for people on the battlefield.
He says drones, unmanned systems and other new technologies will become increasingly important, and service members need training to use them effectively. But he argues recent military operations demonstrate that technology remains part of a broader force.