December 11, 2025

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In this episode of Fed Gov Today, Francis Rose sits down with former Under Secretary of Defense Bill Greenwalt for a candid, detailed look at the Pentagon’s latest acquisition reform effort. Throughout the conversation, Greenwalt speaks openly—sometimes bluntly—about where the reform starts strong, where it falters, and why meaningful change continues to elude the Department of Defense. His insights paint a clear picture of how good intentions can be undermined long before they reach the implementation stage.

Greenwalt begins by praising Secretary Hegseth’s public rollout of the reform initiative. The Secretary’s speech, he explains, hits all the right notes: speed, agility, rapid prototyping, empowered program managers, and the ability to compete with China by moving far faster than the traditional acquisition system allows. These ideas, Greenwalt says, align perfectly with the innovation model that once made the United States dominant in defense technology. He describes the Secretary’s vision as “exactly what was needed.”

But that optimism shifts as the conversation turns to what happens after the speech. Greenwalt recounts how an early draft of the reform memo—leaked before publication—captured much of the Secretary’s intent. The final memo, however, looks noticeably different. By comparing the versions, he sees clear evidence that the strongest reform elements were softened, removed, or surrounded by enough qualifiers to make them optional. He describes this as a classic sign of internal resistance within the acquisition bureaucracy.

One of the most concerning changes, Greenwalt says, is the removal of fixed-time development and production targets. He argues that rapid iteration—getting prototypes into users’ hands early and adjusting quickly—is essential if the U.S. hopes to keep pace with China. Without a commitment to strict timelines, the system simply defaults back to long requirements processes, years-long budget cycles, and slow-moving contracts. In Greenwalt’s view, that old model cannot deliver what today’s combatant commanders urgently need.

Another major retreat comes in the area of flexible funding. The original vision gives program managers and portfolio leaders the authority to move money quickly in response to success or failure. The final memo walks back that idea, leaving funding moves tied to traditional approval chains. Greenwalt says that once those layers re-enter the process, two years of delay follow almost automatically.

He also highlights the diminished role of Other Transaction Authorities (OTAs). Although OTAs are widely touted as a rapid pathway for innovation—especially from nontraditional contractors—the final memo removes strong direction to use them. Greenwalt explains that the contracting workforce remains cautious about OTAs, and without a clear mandate, their use will continue to lag.

Modular open systems, another flagship reform theme, suffers similar dilution. Greenwalt emphasizes that applying modular architectures to existing systems—not just future programs—is essential for inserting new technologies quickly. But the final memo makes that harder, not easier, and introduces waivers that further weaken the requirement.

Throughout the conversation, Greenwalt repeatedly returns to a central theme: without strong, directive language and firm leadership oversight, the acquisition bureaucracy will interpret reforms in ways that preserve the status quo. He argues that senior military leaders and combatant commanders must play a much bigger role in holding the system accountable, since they feel the operational urgency most acutely.

By the end of the conversation, Greenwalt still sees promise in the reform effort—but only if leaders at every level push hard to restore the Secretary’s original intent and pursue even deeper changes.