Presented by HII Mission Technologies
DefenseTech TV presented by HII Mission Technologies examines how the defense community is moving from discussion to execution on the technologies shaping the future fight. Recorded on location at DefenseTech LIVE, this program explores the urgent push to deliver capability faster to the warfighter while integrating autonomy, artificial intelligence, resilient networks, spectrum access, open architectures, and data-driven decision tools into real operational environments. Across the conversations, a consistent theme emerges: speed is not only about buying technology faster. It is about building the architectures, policies, partnerships, and trust needed to make new capabilities useful at the point of need.
The program highlights how leaders across government, industry, research, and the national security community are thinking about decision advantage in a more contested and complex world. Autonomous systems are expanding what individual warfighters can see and control. AI is helping operators manage overwhelming amounts of data. Open systems are becoming essential to interoperability and avoiding vendor lock. Spectrum is emerging as maneuver space. At the same time, adversaries are using low-cost robotic weapons, drones, and distributed systems to challenge traditional U.S. advantages. The result is a defense technology landscape where integration, speed, and adaptability are no longer future goals — they are immediate operational requirements.
Cantwell says the most important conversation is not simply whether the military should use autonomy, but where automation belongs inside the kill chain. The traditional sequence of find, fix, target, track, engage, and assess has historically relied on human judgment at every stage. Now, the challenge is determining where machines can accelerate decisions, process information, and create time for human operators to apply judgment in the most consequential moments.
He notes that the public discussion often focuses narrowly on whether a machine should ever “push the button.” Cantwell argues that is only one piece of a much broader question. In some defensive scenarios, especially mass attacks involving large numbers of drones, missiles, or other threats, humans may not have enough decision space to respond manually to each target. In those cases, automation may be necessary to defend forces and infrastructure.
The conversation also turns to data. Cantwell says the right information must reach the right decision maker at the right time, but the volume of data and the vulnerability of data links create risk. As military systems rely more heavily on unmanned platforms, commercial networks, and distributed sensors, the data foundation itself can become an operational weakness if it is not protected and managed effectively.
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Bell describes a future in which the human operator is less often “in the loop” for every action and more often “on the loop,” supervising autonomous systems and providing commander’s intent. That shift requires more than advanced platforms. It requires integration across systems that were not always designed to work together. Bell says the Department of Defense increasingly wants to take advantage of commercial capabilities, but many commercial products were not built from the ground up for military interoperability.
That makes modular open systems architecture, or MOSA, central to future force design. Bell explains MOSA as breaking systems into components and clearly defining how each component interoperates with the others. Companies can still protect their proprietary “secret sauce,” but the interfaces between systems need to be open and available so the broader mission architecture can work.
Bell says the defense community has moved from skepticism to momentum on MOSA because leaders have seen it work. He points to HII’s work on the Army’s Enduring High Energy Laser program as an example of designing with open architecture from the start. By sharing interface specifications with the government and vendors, the program can draw from multiple suppliers, encourage competition, and avoid a closed system that limits future flexibility.
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That example captures a broader point: autonomy should not be adopted because it is new or exciting. It should be applied to specific operational problems. Cruz says the Naval Research Laboratory’s scientists start with the mission challenge and then determine whether autonomy, artificial intelligence, robotics, sensors, or another technology can help solve it.
Cruz also describes how the laboratory aligns its work with Navy priorities, including the CNO’s fighting instructions and the department’s critical technology areas. He says NRL’s portfolio spans from seabed to space, including cyber, quantum sensing, resilient networks, and undersea technologies. The common thread is helping the Navy prepare for a multi-domain fight in which data, communications, sensing, and decision advantage are essential.
Looking ahead, Cruz says resilient networks are one of the most important areas of focus. As more data moves across different networks and constellations, the Navy must ensure that information is accurate, timely, and available to the right decision makers. He emphasizes that the goal is not simply to collect more information, but to move the right data to the right people at the right time.
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That expansion creates enormous opportunity, but it also creates risk. More sensors mean more data, and more data can overwhelm the operator if it is not organized and prioritized. Hagen says AI tools are becoming essential to help warfighters understand what matters most. Instead of manually directing every asset, the human operator can act more like a strategic supervisor, focusing on priorities while autonomous systems carry out assigned tasks.
Hagen says the infrastructure behind that vision must be invisible to the user. The warfighter should not have to worry about how systems connect, how data flows, or how platforms integrate. That requires interoperability, open interfaces, and modular architectures. If systems from different companies arrive on the battlefield, they must be able to work together and feed a broader system that can process and present data in useful ways.
He also notes that industry and government need to build interoperability into requirements from the start. Without that discipline, programs can drift into vendor lock, limiting flexibility and slowing future upgrades. Hagen says HII’s experience as an integrator informs its approach. Shipbuilding has always required bringing together systems built by different providers, and that same mindset is now essential across autonomous and AI-enabled defense systems.
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DeLeon describes spectrum as the backbone of communications, electronic warfare, unmanned systems, and connected operations. He argues that the department does not simply have a frequency problem; it has a bandwidth problem. The issue is not just whether a specific user can access a specific frequency, but whether the broader network can use available bandwidth efficiently and route communications through the best available path.
To get there, DeLeon says the culture and regulatory framework around spectrum must change. Legacy rules often define frequency use by service or application, reinforcing the idea that a portion of bandwidth belongs to one user or mission. DeLeon says future operations require spectrum-on-demand: automated, open, flexible access that creates maneuver space and allows systems to connect when and where they are authorized.
He compares the desired end state to the way modern cellular and Wi-Fi systems work for users today. If someone is provisioned and authenticated, the network connects them. DeLeon says defense systems need similar seamlessness across installations, tactical environments, and global operations. That means moving away from manual permission processes and toward system-to-system connections that deliver the bandwidth warfighters need.
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Renuart says the urgency around speed is especially visible in unmanned systems. He points to recent examples of unmanned maritime systems being used in ways that would have seemed unconventional not long ago, including combat search and rescue. But he also emphasizes that human judgment remains central. Unmanned systems, sensors, space assets, and optical systems may provide inputs, but commanders still need the ability to coordinate, decide, and execute.
Integration is the core challenge. Renuart says legacy systems such as Link 16 have been overloaded by the growing number of inputs commanders must manage. Future operations will require new ways to sort, prioritize, and deliver information. He says artificial intelligence can help process what matters, separate useful signals from noise, and push decision-quality information down to the tactical edge.
The homeland defense mission adds another layer of complexity. For a commander responsible for threats from space to subsurface, across the Arctic, North America, and surrounding approaches, rules of engagement must be clear, legal, and flexible. Renuart says homeland defense involves unique legal authorities, binational responsibilities, and relationships with allies and partners. As new technologies enter that mission space, leaders must preserve speed while also protecting innocent life, legal frameworks, and international relationships.
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Clark points to the idea of tailored forces as one practical path forward. Instead of trying to integrate autonomous systems across the entire Navy all at once, leaders can create focused force packages built around specific missions. These packages may combine mostly autonomous systems with a smaller number of manned platforms for command, control, or support. Clark says that approach makes the integration problem more manageable.
He says progress is being driven by both operational pull and technology push. Combatant commanders want capabilities that can solve urgent problems, while industry and technology developers are investing heavily in unmanned and autonomous systems. The missing middle has been force generation: the concept development, training, equipping, experimentation, and deployment process that turns technology into usable operational capability.
Clark says accountability matters. Senior leaders have identified the need to generate robotic and autonomous systems in the same way the Navy generates ready submarines, ships, and aircraft. But that requires empowered leaders who can own the mission and move systems from the continental United States to forward operating environments where they are needed.
He also identifies contracting and open architecture as barriers. Acquisition decisions may happen quickly, but contracts and funding can lag. At the same time, systems must be designed with open interfaces so they can interoperate across providers. Without enforcement at the program level, Clark warns, autonomous systems may bunch up before they ever reach the field.
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Dougherty says Iran and its proxies have used this first wave of robotic military capability to level the playing field in ways the United States has not historically encountered. These systems do not need to match U.S. platforms one-for-one. They only need to be cheap, accessible, lethal, and persistent enough to complicate U.S. operations and impose costs over time.
The Houthis are a clear example. Dougherty notes that the U.S. Navy has faced some of its most intense naval combat since World War II against a militia group that would not traditionally be considered a near-peer military threat. That reality, he says, should be a warning. If relatively small actors can use cheap robotic weapons to challenge advanced navies and air forces, the United States must adapt quickly.
Dougherty also agrees that adversaries do not need equivalent force projection to create strategic problems. They may simply need to keep the United States engaged long enough to wear down political will, strain resources, or deter future action. Countries such as Iran, Russia, and China may believe they can absorb punishment longer than the United States is willing to sustain a fight.
For defense leaders, the lesson is that the first wave of robotic weapons is about the commoditization of lethality. Smart munitions, drones, and robotic fires are becoming more available to a wider range of actors. Dougherty says the United States must move beyond reacting to that trend and think more deeply about how autonomy, AI, and robotics can reshape future military advantage.
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